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Wittgenstein’s Inﬂuence on  
Austin’s Philosophy of Language 
1   Introduction 
Wittgenstein and Austin are often grouped together in the history of analytic 
philosophy. This is understandable: Austin’s career coincided Wittgenstein’s second act, 
and during this time, they both developed approaches to philosophy that criticized the 
positivist tradition by carefully emphasizing the ways in which natural language 
actually works. They are thus often imagined as the two principal wellsprings—located 
only eighty miles apart—from which ﬂowed a naturalistic, usage-focused tradition in 
post-positivist philosophy of language. 
This popular image raises the question of inﬂuence. In particular, since 
Wittgenstein seems to have had no appreciation for Austin:  to what extent was 1
Austin’s philosophy of language the product of engagement with Wittgenstein’s work? 
This is a surprisingly diﬃcult question to answer, and there has been no detailed 
attempt to answer it to date. What literature does exist on this issue falls into two 
 Wittgenstein and Austin were together in the same room at least once, on 31st of October 1946, when 1
Austin gave a paper called ‘Nondescription’ at the Moral Sciences Club. The meeting’s minutes show 
that Wittgenstein chaired. In a letter to G. E. Moore a few weeks later, following another paper at the 
Club by H. H. Price, Wittgenstein says that “Price at the last Mor. Sc. Cl. meeting was by far better than 
Austin had been” (McGuinness, 2008, 405). This letter is the only solid evidence we have of what 
Wittgenstein thought about Austin’s work, and it suggests that he thought very little of it, in both senses 
of the phrase.
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I should not like my writing to spare other 
people the trouble of thinking. But if possible, 
to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. 
—Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
1945 Preface to Philosophical Investigations
Let’s see what Witters has to say about that. 
—J. L. Austin,  
1955, recounted by George Pitcher (1973, 24)
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opposing strands, both of which are unsatisfactory. 
The ﬁrst of these strands consists of widespread claims that Wittgenstein’s later 
work was a major inﬂuence on Austin and his colleagues at postwar Oxford. This 
passage from Hans-Johann Glock’s 2008 monograph, What is Analytic Philosophy?, 
gives a typical example of such claims.  2
Wittgenstein’s new ideas, combined with Moore’s common-sense 
philosophy, had a profound impact on a movement which emerged 
around the turn of the 1930s and dominated British philosophy until 
the 1960s. Its opponents called it ‘ordinary language’ or ‘Oxford 
philosophy’, since its most eminent proponents—Ryle, Austin and 
Strawson—were based there. (Glock, 2008b, 42) 
We’ve found that claims of this sort typically aren’t accompanied by evidence of any 
kind, however, and so they tend to come oﬀ as worryingly sweeping and speculative. 
Part of our goal here is to assess them in some detail. 
The second school of thought is what we like to call ‘Oxonian originalism’, both 
because it centers around the claim that Wittgenstein did not inﬂuence Austin—and 
thus that Austin’s views and methodology are largely original to Oxford—and because 
the view’s proponents are mainly Austin’s colleagues or students from Oxford. 
Particularly clear specimens of Oxonian originalism can be found, in several places, in 
the blustery voice of John Searle, who was in Oxford from 1952 until he received his 
D.Phil. in 1959. 
I often read how much Austin was inﬂuenced by Wittgenstein. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Austin had no sympathy 
whatever for Wittgenstein, and I think he was incapable of learning 
from someone whose style was so “loose.” He typically referred to 
Wittgenstein in the style of English schoolboy slang of the time as, 
“Witters,” pronounced “Vitters.”  He thought there were no original 
ideas in Wittgenstein. Indeed he once said to me about 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, “It’s all in Moore,” one of the least 
accurate things I have ever heard Austin say. If Austin had an 
inspirational model, it was Moore. (Searle, 2001, 227)  3
 In a similar vein, Ernest Gellner writes that Ryle and Austin “of course shared and emulated 2
Wittgenstein’s linguistic naturalism and the method based on it” (1959, 23).  And Gary Kemp claims 
that both the Investigations and The Blue and Brown Books “played a decisive role in the rise of so-called 
‘ordinary language’ philosophy, which reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s” (2013, 101).
 Similarly, Grice (1989, 381) quotes Austin as saying “Some like Witters, but Moore is my man”.3
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Similarly, here is Geoﬀrey Warnock, who was Austin’s colleague at Oxford from 1949.  4
. . . he did not join at any time in the general deference to 
Wittgenstein.  The personal atmosphere surrounding Wittgenstein’s 
work strongly repelled him; and it is of course crucial also that 
Wittgenstein rejected, deliberately and on principle, exactly that 
ideal of ﬁnality, of deﬁnite, clearly and fully stated solutions, which 
Austin regarded as alone worth seriously striving for. That 
Wittgenstein inﬂuenced his views has been sometimes suggested, 
but is certainly untrue. (Warnock, 1969, 11) 
The originalists can all be interpreted as putting forward an argument that goes 
something like this: Austin found Wittgenstein’s style and personality distasteful, and 
thought that Wittgenstein’s conclusions and philosophical method were irresponsible 
and loose; therefore, Austin was not inﬂuenced by Wittgenstein.  But the 5
enthymematic premise of this argument equates philosophical inﬂuence with the 
gathering of disciples. This is a false and deeply misleading assumption. 
In fact, we would go so far as to argue that a paradigmatic form of philosophical 
inﬂuence—and perhaps the most philosophically interesting and fruitful form of 
inﬂuence—takes a very diﬀerent form. The dynamic we have in mind occurs when a 
younger philosopher reacts to the work of an older philosopher by recognizing the 
importance of their questions, but comes to believe that they can provide better 
answers to those questions by means of better methods. This is a process by which 
many important and inﬂuential philosophers—as opposed to acolytes and hangers on
—are inﬂuenced by their predecessors.  
This sort of inﬂuence needn’t always be direct, consciously acknowledged, or 
accompanied by reverence for the inﬂuencer. In some cases, the inﬂuencer succeeds in 
 As both of these passages suggest, Oxonian originalism is often premised on the fact that Austin seems 4
to have had disdain for Wittgenstein—both for his philosophical style and for aspects of his personality 
and position in postwar philosophy. Some originalists shared this view themselves. Perhaps the most 
biting illustration of such disdain can be found in a letter written by Isaiah Berlin, dated 9th of May, 
1951, only a week or so after Wittgenstein’s death. 
The Wittgenstein intimates—Miss Anscombe, her husband Geach, and others— 
were thinking of founding a colony in order to live, think, eat and be like Ludwig. 
Originally it was intended to invite L. himself, but now that he is dead they 
propose to establish it anyhow.  A great deal of violent artiﬁcial neurosis, not 
washing etc., anyhow you can imagine—hideous stammering in place of articulate 
speech, perverted Catholicism and all the other delicious attributes. (Berlin 2009, 
229)
 Mathieu Marion provides an even more explicit example of this kind of argument:  5
One frequent but incorrect assumption is that the later Wittgenstein inﬂuenced 
Austin. The fact that there was no real inﬂuence was noted by all who knew him 
well, for example by Ryle who pointed out that ‘Austin took as little as he could 
after Wittgenstein, a lot after Moore’. As a matter of fact, Austin and Wittgenstein 
disliked each other. (Marion, 2000, 509)
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establishing certain questions as the dominant ones of the era, and they come to 
preoccupy the younger philosopher as a result. In principle, this could happen entirely 
via intermediaries, without the younger philosopher ever reading or interacting with 
the older philosopher. Partly for this reason, and partly because it is possible to forget 
or otherwise fail to recognize the source of an idea’s inspiration, a philosopher needn’t 
consciously recognize even major sources of inﬂuence. And even when the source of 
inspiration for one’s ideas are (or should be) clear, there are powerful incentives to 
repress or deny the notion that inﬂuence has taken place, and even to express disdain 
for the inﬂuencer, thereby protecting one’s claim to originality.  Russell’s and Moore’s 6
inﬂuence on Wittgenstein himself could, some would argue, be described in similar 
terms. 
It is compatible with our argument here that Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence on Austin 
was, at least in part, indirect and either unconscious to or repressed by Austin. 
Certainly, by the time of Austin’s mature work on speech acts, Wittgenstein’s ideas 
hung thick in the air. Gilbert Ryle and John Wisdom are among the most obvious 
indirect vectors by which Wittgenstein’s views would have reached Austin, and we will 
discuss both below. And although we have found no evidence of Austin himself 
denying, directly, that he was inﬂuenced by Wittgenstein, some of those who knew 
him have done so, and provided evidence that suggests Austin held Wittgenstein in 
disdain. 
However, we are convinced that at least some of Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence was direct 
and consciously acknowledged by Austin. Our evidence will come from careful 
readings of two texts. In §2, we’ll show that Austin’s essay, ‘The Meaning of a 
Word’ (henceforth, ‘MW’), which was originally presented in 1940 but ﬁrst published 
posthumously in 1961, is the product of extensive and detailed engagement with 
Wittgenstein’s Blue Book (‘BB’)—engagement that Austin seemingly intended his 
audience to recognize as such. And in §3, we’ll argue that Austin’s 1955 William James 
Lectures, which were published posthumously in 1962 as How to do Things with Words 
(‘HTW’), repeatedly allude to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (‘PI’) in ways 
that frame Austin’s speech-act theory as a careful and systematic alternative to what 
Austin took to be Wittgenstein’s theoretically proﬂigate views about language use. Both 
of these points are subtle and easily overlooked, in part because Austin does not cite or 
explicitly mention Wittgenstein in either work. Austin’s citation practices were, shall 
we say, less than generous. But the textual evidence is compelling when properly 
contextualized. 
Finally, a brief disclaimer. Our argument is not intended to show that Wittgenstein 
was the only philosopher, or even the single most important one, to inﬂuence Austin’s 
 The classic discussion of this dynamic, albeit applied to poetry rather than philosophy, is Harold 6
Bloom’s The Anxiety of Inﬂuence; e.g.: “Weaker talents idealize; ﬁgures of capable imagination 
appropriate for themselves. But nothing is got for nothing, and self-appropriation involves the immense 
anxieties of indebtedness, for what strong maker desires the realization that he has failed to create 
himself?” (1973, 5). To be clear: our point here is not to accuse Austin or the Oxonian originalists of 
intellectual dishonesty, but merely to point out that authors are often unreliable sources of information 
about the genesis of their own ideas, and for reasons that are well entrenched in human psychology.
 4
thinking about language. There certainly were other inﬂuences, some of which are well 
documented in the literature, but there clearly isn’t enough space here to compare 
Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence to that of all others. Our aim is, rather, to isolate and make the 
case for one signiﬁcant source of inﬂuence on Austin. 
2    The Blue Book and ‘The Meaning of a Word’ 
One strain of Oxonian originalism is expressed in the claim that Austin was unfamiliar 
with Wittgenstein’s later work until late in his career—sometime after he had begun to 
develop his philosophical views on language. According to Isaiah Berlin, for example, 
so-called ‘Oxford Analysis’ developed “without, so far as I can recollect, any conscious 
reference at the time to Wittgenstein’s later doctrines, even though the ‘Blue Book’ was 
already in circulation in Cambridge, and had, I think, by 1937 or so, arrived in 
Oxford” (Berlin, 1981, 11). And Stuart Hampshire claims that, as of 1936–39, Austin 
“knew very little of Wittgenstein’s later work” (Hampshire, 1969, 44). 
According to various sources, the Blue Book began to circulate within England as 
early as 1936 and, as Berlin reports, it arrived in Oxford soon thereafter (cf. Monk, 
1991, 336–337). By this time, Austin had become part of a community of 
philosophers, together with Berlin and Hampshire, whose most accomplished and 
inﬂuential member was A.J. Ayer, and who held regular philosophical discussions in 
Berlin’s rooms. Austin’s widow has been reported as saying that it is most likely that he 
read BB in the 1930s (Sbisà, 2012, 15n2). 
It is therefore a fair conjecture that Austin would have had access to BB as early as 
1937. Our ﬁrst aim in this section is to present what we think is conclusive textual 
evidence of this conjecture. On the basis of this evidence, we will conclude that 
Austin’s early views on the philosophy of language came together in an atmosphere 
already thick with late-Wittgensteinian inﬂuence, and also that his earliest views on 
language must be understood as the result of his direct engagement with Wittgenstein’s 
post-Tractatus work. 
On February 23rd, 1940, Austin presented ‘The Meaning of a Word’ to the Moral 
Sciences Club in Cambridge. We have been unable to determine whether Wittgenstein 
was present at the talk, but he had himself given a lecture in the Club three weeks 
before. This, however, doesn’t matter much for the present point. It is clear that Austin 
expected Wittgenstein or his students to be in attendance. The text itself bears 
testimony to this fact and wears its debt to Wittgenstein on its sleeve. 
The ﬁrst and most glaring piece of evidence of engagement with BB lies in MW’s 
title, and in its opening lines, which list several variations on its title as “specimens of 
nonsense” (Austin, 1979, 55). It can hardly be a coincidence, and would not have been 
looked upon as such by those in attendance, that Austin’s list consists of 17 variations 
on the very ﬁrst sentence of BB. 
What is the meaning of a word? (Wittgenstein, 1960, 1) 
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Austin announces that the aim of the ﬁrst section of his paper is to “make it clear that 
the phrase ‘the meaning of a word’ is, in general, if not always, a dangerous nonsense 
phrase” (Austin, 1979, 56). He then introduces that same section as follows: 
I begin, then, with some remarks about ‘the meaning of a word’. I 
think many persons now see all or part of what I shall say: but not all 
do, and there is a tendency to forget it, or to get it slightly wrong. In 
so far as I am merely ﬂogging the converted, I apologize to them. 
(Austin, 1979, 56) 
Who are “the converted,” who now see all or part of what he has to say, and what 
exactly caused their conversion? One very plausible explanation of Austin’s words here, 
is that he is alluding to Wittgenstein and the readers of BB. The allusion would surely 
not be lost on the audience.  As noted, the manuscript had been circulating at 
Cambridge for four years by this point, and was well known to students and faculty. In 
fact, Austin makes many points or arguments in MW which are plausibly seen as 
reactions to or inﬂuenced by particular passages in the BB, ﬁve of which we single out 
for discussion here. 
(1) Meaning as use. BB introduces Wittgenstein’s well-known idea that the 
meaning of a word is, in some sense, to be identiﬁed with its use. He spells this out, 
ﬁrst, by suggesting that we look at the ordinary practice of explaining the meaning of a 
word to someone: meaning will be, then, what such an explanation explains 
(Wittgenstein 1960, 1). Wittgenstein claims there are two explanations of this sort, 
‘verbal’ and ‘ostensive.’ He argues, further, that the way in which one learns the 
meaning of a word provides important clues about what it means (e.g. Wittgenstein 
1960, 10-11). 
Austin appears to endorse this picture wholesale. Consider these three examples 
from MW. First, he writes, early in the text: 
Suppose that in ordinary life I am asked: ‘What is the meaning of the 
word racy?’ There are two sorts of thing I may do in response: I may 
reply in words, trying to describe what raciness is and what it is not, 
to give examples of sentences in which one might use the word racy, 
and of others in which one should not. Let us call this sort of thing 
‘explaining the syntactics’ of the word ‘racy’ in the English language. 
On the other hand, I might do what we may call ‘demonstrating the 
semantics’ of the word, by getting the questioner to imagine or even 
actually to experience, situations which we should describe correctly 
by means of sentences containing the words ‘racy’ ‘raciness’, &c., and 
again other situations where we should not use these words. (1979, 
57, italics in original) 
Here, Austin describes Wittgenstein’s own distinction between two sorts of 
explanations of meaning, but gives them new labels: ‘semantic’ instead of ‘ostensive’ 
and ‘syntactic’ instead of ‘verbal’. He also assumes, quite clearly, that these two 
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‘ordinary-life’ ways of explaining the use of a word like ‘racy’ provide signiﬁcant clues 
about its meaning. A little later, Austin argues that traditional philosophical answers to 
questions of this sort—e.g. that meanings are ideas, concepts, or collections of sense-
data—are absolutely hopeless (compare Wittgenstein 1960, 17–18). He makes his point 
by saying that, if he were to give such answers in ordinary life, the questioner, a “plain 
man puzzled,” would stare at him as at an imbecile. And this, Austin appears to think, 
is quite suﬃcient to show that the answers are incorrect (1979, 59). 
Secondly, Austin writes that we could not see what it would mean if someone were 
to say ‘x is extended but has no shape.’  His argument is as follows: ‘In ordinary life we 
never get into a situation where we learn to say that anything is extended but not 
shaped nor conversely. We have all learned to use, and have used, the words only in 
cases where it is correct to use both’ (1979, 68, italics added). 
This point closely resembles several similar points made by Wittgenstein in BB. To 
take only one example, when he wonders how one might learn the meaning of ‘three 
feet’ by estimating lengths, Wittgenstein asserts that 
[…] we must examine the relation of the process of learning to 
estimate with the act of estimating. The importance of this 
examination lies in this, that it applies to the relation between 
learning the meaning of a word and making use of the word. (1960, 
11, italics in original. See also pp. 24, 60, 72) 
Thirdly, in MW Austin undertakes to apply Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning as use in 
challenging the positivist idea—expressed by Ayer—of a distinction between analytic 
and synthetic sentences (Austin 1979, §2). He maintains, ﬁrst, that analyticity cannot 
be explained in terms of the standard idea that meanings have ‘parts’ and, second, that 
the set of all natural language sentences cannot be neatly divided into analytic and 
synthetic. Here is Austin: 
But this is the point: if ‘explaining the meaning of a word’ is really 
the complicated sort of aﬀair that we have seen it to be, and if there 
is really nothing to call ‘the meaning of a word’—then phrases like 
‘part of the meaning of the word x’ are completely undeﬁned: it is 
left hanging in the air, we do not know what it means at all. (1979, 
62-63, italics in original) 
As we shall see shortly, Austin clearly meant to suggest that there is never any object 
which we can properly call ‘the meaning of a word.’ His main point here, however, is 
that if meaning is determined by ordinary explanations of use, the idea that meanings 
have parts becomes obscure or even nonsensical. 
Furthermore, Austin argues that words and sentences never really ‘imply’ 
anything, only using words or asserting something by uttering a sentence can do so. 
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And, thus, talk of analytic ‘sentences’ is again discredited.   Using Moore’s paradox as 7
an example, Austin argues that ‘The cat is on the mat, and I do not believe it’ is absurd 
because “asserting p implies ‘I (who assert p) believe p,’” not because the sentence itself, 
divorced from its use in assertion, implies this (1979, 64).  He goes on to claim that a 
sentence like ‘This x exists,’ where x is an object of perception, e.g.  a noise, cannot 
possibly ﬁt either the analytic or the synthetic category. It might seem analytic, Austin 
maintains, since ‘This noise exists’ appears trivial and its negation absurd. His 
alternative proposal is again based on the distinction between an expression and its 
use: “… using the word ‘this’ (not: the word ‘this’) gives it to be understood that the 
sensum referred to ‘exists’” (1979, 65, his italics). However, he suggests, the sentence as 
such can’t be analytic or synthetic. 
(2) The ‘Augustinian’ conception of language. In BB, Wittgenstein repeatedly warns 
against using proper names as a model for all linguistic expressions. This later becomes 
associated, in the Investigations, but also in the Brown Book, with a passage from 
Augustine’s Confessions.  On the ﬁrst page of BB, Wittgenstein writes that “[s]tudying 8
the grammar of the expression ‘explanation of meaning’ […] will cure you of the 
temptation to look about you for some object which you might call ‘the 
meaning’” (1960, 1). When railing against the idea that the meaning of a word is an 
image in the mind or object correlated with the word, he argues that we make this 
mistake because “we are looking at words as though they all were proper names, and 
we then confuse the bearer of a name with the meaning of the name” (1960, 18; also 
pp. 5, 36, 47). 
In MW, Austin takes the same line in a way that is strikingly reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein’s discussion. One is “tempted to slip back” (1979, 61) into thinking of 
meaning in terms of ‘concepts,’ ‘images,’ or ‘Platonic ideas,’ Austin says, even when one 
understands full well that the meaning of a word is determined by “explaining its 
syntactics and demonstrating its semantics” (1979, 60). Austin writes: 
First, there is the curious belief that all words are names, i.e. in eﬀect 
proper names, and therefore stand for something or designate it in 
the way that a proper name does. (1979, 61, italics in original) 
Here and elsewhere, Austin follows Wittgenstein in using the language of temptation 
or (mental) disease in describing philosophical mistakes (also talking of ‘cures’ and 
‘maladies’). Thus, both the point itself and the ways in which it is presented by the two 
authors are eerily alike. 
(3) The bewitchment of words. Among Wittgenstein’s most familiar and inﬂuential 
ideas is that ordinary language is systematically misleading. Roughly, he thought that, 
 Generalizing this point, in his lectures published as Sense and Sensibilia, Austin holds that “[…] there 7
is no kind of sentence which as such is surprising, or doubtful, or certain, or incorrigible, or 
true” (1962b, 111).
 The Brown Book had also been circulated among philosophers before Austin writes MW, although not 8
as widely as the Blue Book. It is entirely possible that Austin had also read or seen the former (cf. Hacker 
1996, 86).
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below the surface of linguistic expressions that all look somewhat similar, there is a 
broad diversity of function. Overlooking these ‘grammatical’ distinctions, such as the 
one between the objective and subjective uses of ‘I’ and ‘my’ was, Wittgenstein 
thought, responsible for a great deal of confusion in philosophy (1960, 66). Philosophy 
itself was even deﬁned in these terms. Thus, in BB, he asserts: “Philosophy, as we use 
the word, is a ﬁght against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon 
us” (1960, 27). And, of course, the idea is shot through all of the Investigations, 
crystallized in an aphorism: “Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our 
understanding by the resources of our language” (1953/2009, §109). 
This way of thinking was, surely, not entirely new at the time, but Austin’s wording 
and framing of the point in MW seems to owe something directly to Wittgenstein. 
When describing the source of philosophical mistakes, he says that he thinks he can 
see “that there are diﬃculties about our powers of imagination, and about the curious 
way in which it is enslaved by words” (1979, 67). To illustrate this point, he suggests 
that the reason why one cannot see what someone could mean by saying ‘x is extended 
but has no shape’ is that the meanings of the two nouns are so restricted as to describe 
and evoke only the ordinary cases. And those cases are, allegedly, mutually exclusive. 
As Austin puts it, “[o]rdinary language blinkers the already feeble imagination” (1979, 
68, italics in original). It’s surely possible that he is alluding to others, such as Ryle, but 
Ryle was commonly known to have been profoundly inﬂuenced by Wittgenstein ever 
since they became friends in 1929, publishing a paper called ‘Systematically 
Misleading Expressions’ four years later. Describing their ﬁrst meeting, Ryle says he 
had already been a ‘mystiﬁed admirer’ of the Tractatus, particularly because of the 
distinction it makes between sense and nonsense (Ryle 1970, 5). The same 
consideration applies, just more strongly, if Austin’s words are taken as allusions to 
Wisdom, who was more explicit than most that his writings were heavily indebted to 
Wittgenstein. One can clearly be inﬂuenced by Socrates through the medium of Plato 
(though no analogy is perfect). 
(4) Craving for generality. Wittgenstein announces that instead of giving any kind 
of general answer to a philosophical question such as “What are signs?” he would 
rather “look closely at particular cases which we should call ‘operating with 
signs’” (1960, 16).  The misguided goal of answering questions about the nature of 
things in general—as opposed to questions about particular things—arises from 
philosophers’ deep-seated “craving for generality” and a misplaced desire to emulate 
the “method of science” (1960, 17–18). 
That this point made a lasting impression on Austin is clearly on display in MW: 
I can only answer a question of the form ‘What is the meaning of 
“x”?’ if “x” is some particular word you are asking about. This 
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supposed general question is really just a spurious question of a type 
which commonly arises in philosophy. (1979, 58)  9
It seems, moreover, that one of Austin’s actual motivations in writing MW was to 
expose an apparent inconsistency in Wittgenstein’s thinking. BB itself kicks oﬀ with a 
question—‘What is the meaning of a word?’—that, according to Austin, falls foul of 
the ban on generalities. In labeling the question a specimen of nonsense, Austin thus 
ﬁnds Wittgenstein wanting by a strict application of his own methodological 
principles. 
(5) Family resemblance. In BB, Wittgenstein says that the craving for generality is 
partly explained by the misguided tendency to assume that there must be something 
in common to all entities which are ordinarily subsumed under a single word. He 
famously proposes that a noun like ‘game’ really only applies to a family of variously 
related activities, so diﬀerent games need not have any characteristics in common 
(1960, 17). Relatedly, Wittgenstein claims that although “[…] in general we don’t use 
language according to strict rules”, comparing language use to rule-governed activities 
can be helpful in dissolving philosophical problems (1960, 25). 
In MW, Austin puts a distinctively Oxonian spin on this idea. He argues “that it is 
not in the least true that all the things which I ‘call by the same (general) name’ are in 
general ‘similar’” (1979, 69, italics in original). Staying true to his classical education, 
he uses Aristotle’s example of ‘healthy’ as an illustration, which has a certain core 
meaning but exhibits considerable variation. Although he does not discuss 
Wittgenstein’s example of ‘game,’ he illustrates the point by appeal to words for two 
particular games, ‘cricket’ and ‘golf ’.  10
Austin’s lecture also includes memorable observations on the lack of strict and 
comprehensive rules for the use of language. He imagines a cat which, unexpectedly, 
delivers a philippic. Is it still a cat? Was it never a real cat? Here, Austin says, ordinary 
language simply breaks down and we are at a loss for words (1979, 67–68). Although 
Wittgenstein does not use such absurdities to illustrate the point in BB, he does 
precisely that in PI, §80, where he imagines a chair that disappears and reappears. This 
remark was actually written in Wittgenstein’s notebook in 1936 (see MS 152, 79[1]), so 
it could possibly have reached Austin by word of mouth, e.g. through Friedrich 
 This negative claim also plays a leading role in ‘Other Minds’ (1946) and Sense & Sensibilia (1962b). Of 9
course, Austin still believed that some measure of generality and theory construction was sensible—the 
theory of speech acts would not have been possible otherwise.
 Nikolay Milkov (2003, 155n10) agrees, and writes that it’s ‘obvious’ that Austin is following 10
Wittgenstein here.
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Waismann or Stuart Hampshire.  Waismann would make much of these kinds of 11
examples when introducing concepts with ‘open-texture’ in his article ‘Veriﬁability,’ 
where he imagines meeting a friend who suddenly evaporates and reappears (1945, 
122). Both Waismann and Hampshire were teaching in Oxford by 1939, and 
Waismann showed Hampshire the typescript of the book— completed two years 
earlier—on which he had been working with Wittgenstein for a long time (Hacker 
1996, 163–164). 
Hampshire and Austin began working closely together no later than 1937, when 
they started meeting regularly with other Oxford philosophers in All Souls. In MW, 
Austin cites Hampshire’s ﬁrst published article, which he had delivered to the 
Aristotelian Society in December 1939, just two months before Austin’s delivery of 
MW at Cambridge (1979, 60n1).  There can be no doubt, after studying his ﬁrst article, 
that Hampshire had read and been inﬂuenced by BB. For example, Hampshire makes 
crucial use of the notion of criteria of identity in his argument. He asserts that 
sentences have clear criteria of identity but that this is not so clear in the case of 
propositions (1939, 22–23). Although Wittgenstein must have taken this terminology 
from Frege’s Grundlagen (1884) it seems much more likely that Hampshire picked it up 
from reading BB (e.g., pp. 55, 61). 
To hammer the point home, however, it can be shown that Hampshire’s paper is 
also inﬂuenced by BB in many of the ways listed above. For example, Hampshire 
speaks of sentences which refer “to no imaginable situation because our rules of use 
are what they are,” and states that “in the ordinary use of language deﬁnitions are not 
so explicitly and thoroughly formulated as to provide for all possible cases” (1939, 16). 
Later he objects to the craving for generality, saying that the question “What do all 
sentences mean as such?” is unanswerable and insigniﬁcant (1939, 19). And, like 
Austin, he repeats Wittgenstein’s distinction between ‘verbal’ and ‘ostensive’ 
explanations of meaning, without using those exact labels (1939, 19, also 12–13). 
It seems to us that the best explanation of this textual evidence, taken as a whole, is 
that Austin and Hampshire had both read and engaged seriously with the arguments 
in BB. Their own ideas are inﬂuenced and infused with Wittgenstein’s thought on a 
range of issues. Most probably, they discussed BB thoroughly before writing their 
lectures. Hampshire’s contention that Austin was unfamiliar with Wittgenstein’s work 
at the time must therefore be seen as either disingenuous or based on a lapse of 
memory. In light of the fact that all of this evidence has been available for decades, we 
 Note that absurdities of this sort are often discussed by Wittgenstein. There is the case of lumps of 11
cheese suddenly growing or shrinking (1953, §142), houses turning into steam and cattle speaking 
words (1969, §513). And in Zettel, Wittgenstein essentially makes Austin’s point: 
If you imagine certain facts otherwise, describe them otherwise, than the way they 
are, then you can no longer imagine the application of certain concepts, because 
the rules for their application have no analogue in the new circumstances. (1969, 
§350)
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therefore ﬁnd it remarkable that scholars have persisted in denying that Austin’s early 
work bore Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence.  12
3   How To Do Things With Wittgenstein 
We are convinced that Austin’s earliest work on the philosophy of language was 
steeped in Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence. But what about the later work for which Austin is 
best known? In particular, what about How to do Things with Words (HTW)? Can this 
founding document of speech-act theory also be dusted for Wittgenstein’s 
ﬁngerprints? 
There are some reasons to think that Austin’s theory of speech acts predated much 
of his contact with Wittgenstein’s published later work, in particular the Philosophical 
Investigations. In his editorial preface to HTW, J. O. Urmson quotes an unpublished 
supplemental note, reporting that “Austin says of the views that underlie these lectures 
that they ‘were formed in 1939’” (Austin, 1962a, v). Moreover, some of the ideas that 
eventually made their way into HTW were presented in talks and published work at 
least as early as 1946—for example, in Austin’s Cambridge lecture on ‘Nondescription’ 
and in his 1946 Aristotelian Society paper, ‘Other Minds’. 
But although the early inspiration that eventually led to the theory of speech acts 
may have struck as early as the late 1930’s, there are good reasons to think Austin’s 
work on speech acts took the form that has become canonical only in the mid-1950’s, 
around the time when Austin prepared his 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard, 
which were published as HTW, as well as a 1956 BBC radio talk which was later 
published as ‘Performative Utterances’ (PU). We think it likely that Austin developed 
his views about speech-acts in stages whose development is mirrored by the structure 
of HTW. The most memorable and inﬂuential concepts of Austin’s mature theory—
including the idea of a speech act, as well as the distinction between locutionary, 
illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts—don’t make their ﬁrst appearance until the 
eighth lecture of HTW. Probably, then, Austin developed those concepts late in the 
process of writing the 1955 typescript on which HTW is based. He started working on 
the typescript as early as after the summer of 1952, which is when he began delivering 
his yearly lectures entitled ‘Words and Deeds’ at Oxford, and according to Urmson 
they always covered “approximately the same ground as the William James 
Lectures” (Austin, 1962a, vi).  Since there are unmistakable allusions to Wittgenstein 
and the Investigations in HTW and PU (see below), it is reasonable to think that 
Austin developed his speech-act theory partly in response to Wittgenstein’s views, 
which were widely known. The earlier HTW lectures are taken up with various 
 Lynd Forguson (2001, 332-333), for example, claims that Austin’s ﬁrst published paper ‘Are There A 12
Priori Concepts?’ (1939) contains ‘no trace’ of Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence, and implies that Wittgenstein 
must therefore have had very little inﬂuence on Austin. It is surprising that neither Forguson nor, 
apparently, anyone else has considered MW in connection to this question, given that it was delivered at 
the same stage of his early career.  The only exception we know of is Stanley Cavell who, very brieﬂy in a 
footnote, points out that (‘curiously’) MW is Austin’s most Wittgensteinian piece of writing (Cavell 
1969: 97n2).
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attempts to draw a distinction between performative and constative utterances—a 
distinction that Austin ultimately abandons at the end of the seventh lecture.  And it 13
is the distinction between performative and constative utterances, rather than the 
mature theory of speech acts, for which we ﬁnd evidence in Austin’s work from the 
1940s. 
Austin’s surviving prewar writings, including MW (as we saw in §2), show little 
sign of his mature views, giving the lie to Austin’s claim that his views were in place by 
1939. In ‘Other Minds’ (1946), the only early glimmer of the ideas in HTW is Austin’s 
discussion of the possibility that ﬁrst-person knowledge ascriptions are performative 
utterances, and his comparison of them to promises in this regard. The essay contains 
neither the concept of an illocutionary act nor the doctrine of felicity conditions. It is 
therefore consistent with what we know that Austin’s speech-act theory developed in 
the late 1940s or early 1950s, and perhaps only after he’d read the Investigations after 
they were published in April or May 1953.  14
It is important to point out that there are at least two senses of the phrase ‘speech-
act theory’, each of which may be applied to precursors of Austin. In its ﬁrst, broader 
sense, the phrase is used to refer to an area of inquiry within the philosophy of 
language that admits of competing approaches. Speech-act theory, on this conception, 
is the study of assertions, questions, commands, and other illocutionary acts, whatever 
their natures turn out to be.  The disagreement at the center of speech-act theory in 
this sense is the question of what constitutes the performance of an illocutionary act—
a question for which there are quite a few answers currently on the table.  In its second, 
narrower sense, ‘speech-act theory’ names a particular theoretical approach to speech-
act theory in the broad sense. This is the tradition of taking illocutionary acts to be 
‘conventional procedures’, deﬁned by the conditions of their felicitous performance—
and this is the view defended by Austin himself and later by Searle (1965, 1969). In 
order to avoid ambiguity, we’ll use ‘speech-act theory’ in its broad sense, and we’ll use 
‘conventionalism’ for Austin’s own theoretical approach. 
Speech-act theory had been going on, here and there, before Austin popularized 
the term ‘speech act’. In similar passages near the beginning of HTW and PU, Austin 
makes it clear that his work has precursors, locating his own inquiry within a broader 
movement away from the idea that language is primarily for making statements. 
According to Austin, this movement had happened in two stages. Stage one came 
when some philosophers began to claim that certain putative statements were actually 
nonsensical, and so weren’t proper statements at all. Stage two arrived when 
philosophers began to “set some limits to the amount of nonsense that we are prepared 
to admit we talk”, and, in turn, began to ask “whether many apparent pseudo-
statements really set out to be ‘statements’ at all” (1962a, 2–3). 
 The same structure is embodied by PU and ‘Performatif–Constatif ’ (1963), which Austin presented 13
in Royaumont in March, 1958. 
 Thanks to Christian Erbacher for discussion about the publication date. Milkov (2003, 188) writes 14
that PI was published on 1st May.
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The only philosopher Austin cites in connection to each stage is Kant (this in the 
HTW version of the passage), but appears to be meant as a bit of coy or ironic 
misdirection. (Indeed, he leads oﬀ his description of these two movements with the 
phrase, ‘[b]ut now in recent years …’ (HTW, 2).) It is easy to see from Austin’s 
allusions to the veriﬁcation principle that the perpetrators of stage one count among 
their ranks the logical positivists. In particular, we should think of A. J. Ayer, who was 
a foil for much of Austin’s work, and whose seminal 1936 monograph, Language, 
Truth, and Logic, declares all of metaphysics, religion, and ethics to be nonsensical. 
Austin allusively links his second stage to the early expressivisms of C. L. Stevenson 
(1937, 1944) and R. M. Hare (1952) by saying that “‘ethical propositions’ are perhaps 
intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to inﬂuence it 
in special ways” (Austin, 1962a, 2–3). 
But it is also natural to interpret Austin’s descriptions of the two stages, at least in 
part, as allusions to the early and late Wittgenstein, respectively.  Although the practice 
of alleging nonsense for philosophical purposes had its 20th-Century origin in Russell’s 
theory of types, and Frege’s discussion of the concept-object distinction, it ﬁrst grew 
into a bludgeon near the end of the Tractatus, where Wittgenstein concludes that all 
non-scientiﬁc statements, including those of ethics, metaphysics, and even his own 
philosophical views are, strictly speaking, nonsensical and so cannot be expressed. 
Austin describes the second stage in terms of “the new slogan—of the ‘diﬀerent uses of 
language’”, and this is most likely an allusion to the later Wittgenstein’s work and 
inﬂuence (1979, 234).  Moreover, Austin illustrates this point by saying that 
many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently 
descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd 
feature of the reality thus reported, but to indicate (not to report) the 
circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to 
which it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken or the like. 
(Austin, 1962a, 3) 
The distinction between reporting and indicating to which Austin here alludes closely 
resembles distinctions drawn by Wittgenstein—for example, his distinction between 
subjective and objective uses of the ﬁrst person. (We’ll expand on the inﬂuence of this 
idea on Austin below.) Given the fervor with which both phases of Wittgenstein’s work 
had swept the philosophical world by the mid-1950’s, Austin could not have but 
expected sophisticated readers to have understood these passages as allusions to 
Wittgenstein. 
In the very next paragraph of PU, Austin’s allusions to Wittgenstein become 
undeniable. 
Certainly there are a great many uses of language. It’s rather a pity 
that people are apt to invoke a new use of language whenever they 
feel so inclined, to help them out of this, that, or the other well-
known philosophical tangle; we need more of a framework in which 
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to discuss these uses of language; and also I think we should not 
despair too easily and talk, as people are apt to do, about the inﬁnite 
uses of language. Philosophers will do this when they have listed as 
many, let us say, as seventeen; but even if there were something like 
ten thousand uses of language, surely we could list them all in time. 
This, after all, is no larger than the number of species of beetle that 
entomologists have taken the pains to list. (Austin, 1979, 121) 
This passage plainly alludes to §23 of PI, where Wittgenstein declares that “there are 
countless diﬀerent kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, ‘sentences’,” before 
supporting this claim with a list of uses of language. If we individuate the items on this 
list using semicolons and em-dashes (not the only option, but a reasonable one), then 
Wittgenstein’s list has exactly seventeen items. 
Austin’s conception of his relationship to Wittgenstein in the mid-1950’s is further 
illustrated by an anecdote recounted by George Pitcher, who was a graduate student at 
Harvard when Austin delivered his William James Lectures. Pitcher reports that, 
having already resolved to work on themes raised by the Investigations, he was excited 
by the seemingly related content of Austin’s lectures. In this context, Pitcher visited 
Austin’s oﬃce, where the following scene unfolded. 
In the course of our conversation, I let it be known that I thought 
words were tools, with manifold uses. Austin said, ‘Let’s see what 
Witters has to say about that’, and he reached for his copy of the 
Philosophical Investigations. He read, among others, section 23, 
where Wittgenstein lists some of the uses of language—giving 
orders, speculating about an event, play-acting, making a joke, and 
so on. Austin remarked that these things are all quite diﬀerent, and 
can’t just be lumped together like that. (Pitcher, 1973, 24) 
What did Austin mean by saying that Wittgenstein’s diﬀerent uses of language “are all 
quite diﬀerent, and can’t be lumped together”? The answer can be found in a passage 
from the eighth HTW lecture, in which Austin makes essentially the same point, but 
then expands on it by pointing out that many ‘uses of language’ don’t count as either 
illocutionary or perlocutionary acts. 
… the expression ‘use of language’ can cover other matters even 
more diverse than the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. For 
example, we may speak of the ‘use of language’ for something, e.g. 
for joking; and we may use ‘in’ in a way diﬀerent from the 
illocutionary ‘in’, as when we say ‘in saying “p” I was joking’ or 
‘acting a part’ or ‘writing poetry’; or again we may speak of ‘a 
poetical use of language’ as distinct from ‘the use of language in 
poetry’. These references to ‘use of language’ have nothing to do with 
the illocutionary act. … The normal conditions of reference may be 
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suspended, or no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary act … 
(1962a, 104) 
This passage immediately follows Austin’s introduction of the distinction between 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, and thus contributes to its initial 
framing of the central concepts of speech-act theory. Thus, he once again frames his 
inquiry with an allusion to Wittgenstein, but now with an explanation of how his own 
view—armed with systematic distinctions and stripped of an aversion to positive 
theorizing—constitutes an improvement over Wittgenstein’s unsystematic talk of ‘uses 
of language’. First, the latter talk blurs any distinction between the locutionary, 
illocutionary, and perlocutionary. For example, one can talk of using a sentence as a 
warning (illocutionary act) just as well as using a sentence to persuade (perlocutionary 
act). Secondly, ‘use’ can go beyond anything covered by the threefold distinction, such 
as when language is used jokingly or poetically. Thirdly, some speech acts, such as for 
insinuating or evincing emotion (e.g. ‘I swear …’), are also uses of language while it is 
less clear whether, or how exactly, they would ﬁt into Austin’s classiﬁcation. Note, also, 
that at this point Austin has already stated that even if talk of ‘meaning’ is “hopelessly 
ambiguous,” switching to ‘use’ makes us no better oﬀ, clearly alluding to Wittgenstein’s 
well known ideas (1962a, 100). 
That Austin repeatedly frames his inquiry into speech acts as an improvement over 
Wittgenstein’s approach to language use is illuminating.  These passages strongly 
suggest that Austin took his subject matter to be the same as Wittgenstein’s, even if he 
thought that Wittgenstein’s own approach to that subject matter was lazy and 
methodologically unsound. Austin’s view seems to have been that Wittgenstein’s late 
philosophy of language represented some of the earliest, clumsy steps in the 
philosophical study of language use. Austin’s theory of speech acts represents a more 
mature, careful, and systematic take on the same topic. 
So far, we have suggested that Austin’s views about language developed out of an 
engagement with Wittgenstein and the issues he raised. In short, we think it likely that 
engagement with Wittgenstein’s work helped to shape Austin’s conception of speech-
act theory, understood in the broad sense as the study of the various things that we do 
with language. 
Can we also ﬁnd traces of Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence on Austin’s positive, 
conventionalist approach to speech-act theory?  Here our enterprise veers a little into 
more speculative terrain, but we think that an aﬃrmative answer is at least quite 
plausible. Speciﬁcally, there is a widespread and inﬂuential (if not necessarily accurate) 
reading of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, on which it anticipates 
Austin’s conventionalism in important ways. 
Austin’s notion of speech-acts grew out of his struggle to make a principled 
distinction between performative and constative utterances. When he realized that no 
such distinction could be made—because so-called constatives were speech acts in 
exactly the same sense that performatives were—he traded the performative–
constative distinction for the threefold distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, 
and perlocutionary acts. The very idea of a performative utterance, however, is 
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arguably inﬂuenced by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book—a point that shows through in 
Austin’s earliest appeal to the performative-constative distinction in ‘Other 
Minds’ (1946).  15
In BB and elsewhere, Wittgenstein argues that to utter a sentence like ‘I am in pain’ 
is not to make a statement about anyone in particular or to describe any mental state 
(1960, 67). Rather, it is more like the act of moaning, so that pain is expressed directly 
in one’s behavior (1960, 68-69, 74). ‘She is in pain’, however, is considered to be very 
diﬀerent. Here, Wittgenstein is widely interpreted as deﬂating the idea that we have 
incorrigible access to our own mental states; our temptation to assume that we do is 
explained by the fact that we express pain with ﬁrst-person sentences that superﬁcially 
resemble the third-person sentences we use to describe others’ pain. But expressing a 
mental state like pain in language is just a sophisticated substitute for instinctual pain-
behavior. And that’s why, according to him, it makes little sense to raise epistemic 
doubts in such cases. 
Not only is this distinction canvassed in BB, it is also the note that sounds 
throughout Wisdom’s articles on other minds, published in Mind 1940-1943, where 
Wisdom continually ﬂags his debt to Wittgenstein in footnotes.  Austin’s own article 16
‘Other Minds’ is explicitly addressed to Wisdom’s work and its ﬁnal 1946 instalment. 
He even begins with what should likely be taken as a humorous allusion to 
Wittgenstein and his disciples, by joking that he must be “… one sort of fool to rush 
over ground so well trodden by the angels” (1979, 77). 
Some of Austin’s article is taken up with a distinction between ﬁrst- and third-
person uses of psychological verbs. An example to which Austin follows Wittgenstein 
in devoting considerable attention is ‘I know’, which, like Wittgenstein, he takes to be 
used as an expression of assurance or conﬁdence, rather than to report on a state of 
mind, as in ‘she knows’.  But whereas this instance of Austin’s distinction appears to be 17
drawn from Wittgenstein, Austin goes on to argue that the distinction between ﬁrst- 
and third-person uses of verbs extends beyond psychological examples. Anticipating 
his later discussions in the early sections of HTW and PU, Austin points out, for 
example, that saying ‘I promise’ is an act of promising whereas saying ‘She promises’ is 
merely to describe such an act and, according to Austin, couldn’t be an act of 
promising (1979, 98n1). As Pears (1988, 347n34) notes, the two philosophers diﬀer in 
 We are not the ﬁrst to note the similarity between Wittgenstein’s remarks on expressive, non-15
descriptive uses of ﬁrst-person statements involving psychological verbs and Austin’s performatives 
(e.g., Pears 1988, 346–347; Dummett 1981, 332–335). It should be noted, however, that Austin’s notion 
of a performative must also have been inﬂuenced by H. A. Prichard’s work on promising (see, especially, 
Prichard 1949, ch. 7). This has been pointed out before (Warnock 1969, 5; Hampshire 1969, 43–44).
 See, for example, Wisdom (1952, 174–175, 208). Berlin identiﬁes Wisdom as one of the earliest 16
indirect routes by which the later Wittgenstein’s views reached Austin (Berlin, 1981, 11–15); see Hacker 
(1996, 95).
 See, e.g., Wittgenstein (1960, 19–20, 23, 26–27). Later, in On Certainty, he writes: “We are asking 17
ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know …”?  For it is not a question of mental processes or 
mental states. And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not” (1969, §230). 
Compare Austin (1979, 98–103). 
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that Wittgenstein’s examples involve instinctual or natural expressive acts, while Austin 
expands his interest to include conventional or ritualistic acts, including the act of 
marrying, which would come to be a central example in HTW. This gives us some 
reason to think that Austin’s notion of a performative utterance was conceived of as a 
precisiﬁcation or development of Wittgenstein’s category of naturally expressive 
speech.  18
Later, in Austin’s mature speech-act theory, illocutionary acts are considered to be 
linguistic instances of “conventional procedures”; to perform one is to behave in a way 
that conforms to a suite of ‘felicity conditions’, which are deﬁned by pre-existing social 
conventions. To christen a ship, for example, just is to utter a certain form of words in 
certain prescribed circumstances while possessing a certain position of authority and 
certain mental states, and all of this is a matter of the local customs and laws in whose 
jurisdiction one falls.  For Austin, the project of describing the range of possible 
illocutionary acts boiled down to classifying them according to their felicity 
conditions. Generalizations about the nature of illocutionary acts take the form of 
generalizations about the features of the social conventions that deﬁne them (1962a, 
14–18). 
Conventionalism, a diﬀerent version of which has been developed by Searle 
(1965), stands in contrast to a variety of other theories of the nature of illocutionary 
acts. Alternatives include theories on which illocutionary acts are individuated in 
terms of the speaker’s intentions (Bach and Harnish, 1979; Grice, 1989; Schiﬀer, 1972; 
Strawson, 1964), their characteristic eﬀects on the shared conversational context 
(Lewis, 1979; Portner, 2004; Roberts, 2004, 2012; Stalnaker, 1978), the kinds of 
psychological states they express (Bar-On, 2004; Green, 2007), the discursive 
commitments they engender (Brandom, 1994; MacFarlane, 2011), or the epistemic 
norms that govern them (Williamson, 2000). Given this range of options, we can 
intelligibly ask whether Wittgenstein held any of these views, or early prototypes of 
them, and, if so, which? Answering this question is diﬃcult for at least two reasons. 
First, much has been made of the idea that Wittgenstein is an anti-theoretical 
philosopher, and so it may be objected that it does not make sense to read him as 
putting forward a theory of speech acts. This may be correct when it comes to the 
project of Wittgenstein exegesis—an issue on which we can remain neutral— but the 
point is irrelevant to the question at hand. Even if it is ultimately a misreading of 
Wittgenstein to project theoretical commitments onto him, still, he appears to make 
many claims about the nature of language and meaning, and many interpreters have 
attempted to organize these claims into a cohesive view. Our claim is only that it is 
most plausible to interpret Austin as having drawn on this kind of reading (we argue 
for this claim below). 
Secondly, each of the approaches mentioned above can be seen to be inﬂuenced by 
some parts of Wittgenstein’s later work.  And, indeed, some proponents of non-
 Note that Gilbert Ryle also described such expressions in The Concept of Mind (1949), calling them 18
‘avowals’ (see pp. 101–102, 183–184). It is uncontroversial that Ryle is inﬂuenced here by Wittgenstein—
although, famously, he doesn’t cite anyone at all in that book.
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conventionalist approaches to speech-act theory explicitly mention Wittgenstein as an 
inspiration.  This should not be so surprising if Wittgenstein was anti-theoretical in 19
the sense explained. Even if he was, his work was undeniably pregnant with deep pre-
theoretical insight, and he seems to have been pulled in the direction of diﬀerent 
theories of language at diﬀerent times in his life. Again, our goal is to argue merely that 
the proto-Austinian reading of Wittgenstein is a popular and tempting one, and may 
have stood out to Austin himself, not that these other potential readings are incorrect 
or implausible. 
With these caveats in mind, it is clear that (i) PI easily and readily invites a 
conventionalist interpretation, especially when seen through the prism of BB, (ii) this 
is still considered to be the most accurate and compelling interpretation by many 
inﬂuential Wittgenstein scholars today and, most importantly perhaps, (iii) this was 
indeed the considered interpretation of Austin’s contemporaries and colleagues. 
Take for example the inﬂuential exegetical work of Baker, Hacker and Glock (e.g., 
Baker & Hacker 2005a, 2005b; Glock 1996, 2008a; Hacker 2010). On their view, very 
roughly, Wittgenstein holds that language is best understood by analogy to games, 
such as chess.  Games are governed by conventional rules that determine the correct 
use of an item or device that is subject to the conventions. To explain the role or 
‘meaning’ of a chess piece is to explain the rules governing its proper use in the game 
of chess. Similarly, since the meaning of a word cannot simply be an object—of any 
sort—to which the word refers, it is better to say that the meaning of a word is 
determined by its correct use in the language.   
Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss (2010) argue that such an interpretation “remains 
stuck in [Wittgenstein’s] middle period” (p. 156). That is to say, it overlooks important 
diﬀerences between BB and other writings from the early 30’s on the one hand, and the 
Investigations on the other, supposing that sentences can simply be plucked from the 
former to clarify ideas in the latter. This procedure results in a thoroughly 
conventionalist interpretation, since in his middle period Wittgenstein is more easily 
seen as a conventionalist. Since Austin had been familiar with BB for many years 
before reading PI it is not surprising that he would read the former into the latter in 
this way, like many others did and continue to do.  
Further support derives from the fact that most of Austin’s colleagues and 
contemporaries read Wittgenstein as a conventionalist. Already in January 1954, Peter 
Strawson published a long critical notice of PI, spelling out a conventionalist 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s theory of linguistic meaning. Strawson writes that, for 
the author, the meaning of a word “… is a matter of the customary practice of the user” 
(1954, 85), that obeying a rule is to conform to “… an agreed common practice” which 
sometimes requires the existence of “… agreed common criteria” (p. 81). ‘Customary 
practice’ is the criterion for correct applications of a rule (p. 80). About a year later, 
Paul Feyerabend also published a long review, reaching similar conclusions. 
 Wittgenstein can be seen as a precursor to Gricean intentionalism, for example (Unnsteinsson 2016). 19
Similarly, Bar-On (2015) cites Wittgenstein as holding a precursor to expression-theoretic views. And 
Sellars (1954) and Brandom (1994) read a version of their own normative functionalisms into his work.
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Wittgenstein, on his view, articulates—but can’t be said to fully endorse—a theory 
according to which “… the meaning of a sign is constituted by its use within a certain 
language-game” (1955, 476). And language-games, on Feyerabend’s reading, are 
customs (p. 475).  20
Ultimately, then, it is rather easy to imagine how a conventionalist reading may 
have stuck out to Austin as he was formulating his own version of speech-act theory. 
For example, if we were to substitute “social convention” for “language game”, in §21 of 
the Investigations, it reads as a straightforwardly conventionalist account of the 
distinction between reports and orders: 
Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number 
of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-
stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place. — Such a report 
might run: “Five slabs”.  Now what is the diﬀerence between the 
report or statement “Five slabs” and the order “Five slabs!”? — Well, 
it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language-
game.  21
For Austin, reports and orders are paradigmatic examples of illocutionary acts, which 
are “done as conforming to a convention” (1962a, 105). This is what makes them 
diﬀerent from perlocutionary acts, wherein a speaker brings about or achieves 
something in a way that goes beyond the conventional import of what they do. So, 
given the reading of Wittgenstein that we’ve summarized, Wittgenstein and Austin 
agree in broad strokes: what one does in speaking is determined by the conventional 
rules to which one conforms in speaking; which rules are in eﬀect is a matter of the 
activity in which one is engaged; the nature of this activity is ultimately a matter of 
social convention. 
To be sure, it is impossible, when discussing HTW, to reach anything like the 
certainty we feel about Wittgenstein’s inﬂuence on Austin’s early views and writings. If 
any of Austin’s notebooks, student notes, lecture notes or other unpublished material 
from the late 1940s and early 1950s comes to light, we might be able to stand on ﬁrmer 
ground and have a better grasp of how Austin’s ideas developed over time.  22
However, it is consistent with what we know, and independently plausible, that 
some of the most consequential ideas in HTW were developed by Austin in response 
to Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus philosophy of language. Austin clearly believed that 
Wittgenstein was asking new and important questions. And part of Wittgenstein’s 
 Norman Malcolm’s (1954) review is much harder to pin down and is open to both conventionalist 20
and less conventionalist interpretations.
 See also, for example, PI, §§41, 199, 241–242. And, in §355, Wittgenstein writes, simply, that the 21
language of sense impressions, “… like any other, rests on convention.”
 The published version of HTW is based on Austin’s notes, ‘Words and Deeds,’ the typescript of which 22
is housed at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. In the Appendix, p. 165, Urmson explains that the 
manuscript corresponds quite closely to the published text of HTW and, so, it can tell us only about 
Austin’s views as they stood in 1955, providing little or no illumination on how the views developed.
 20
apparent answer to these questions—that meaning is use and use is determined by 
rules or conventions—seems to have provided Austin with a sensible, yet vague, 
starting point. 
Conclusion 
Although the precise timing and details of Wittgenstein’s impact on Austin remain 
unclear, we think it relatively clear that Austin’s philosophy of language was infused, at 
each crucial stage in its development, with Wittgenstein’s thought. First, in light of the 
impact of Wittgenstein’s Blue Book on ‘The Meaning of a Word’, we should conclude 
that Wittgenstein was among Austin’s important early inﬂuences. Second, we have 
presented some reasons to think that Austin’s earliest extant use of the performative–
constative distinction began as a generalization of Wittgenstein’s distinction between 
expressive and descriptive uses of psychological predicates. Third—although the 
evidence for this point is less decisive—it is consistent with the currently available 
evidence that Wittgenstein’s later work, including the Philosophical Investigations, 
shaped Austin’s mature work on speech acts—both by framing the questions he aimed 
to address and by helping to inspire Austin’s own, more systematic answers to those 
questions. 
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